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 Since the 1960’s, computers have been regularly promoted as both 
the salvation of redistricting and as a strong corrupting force. On the 
one hand, computing has been proposed as a way to remove human 
bias from the process of drawing electoral lines through automation 
and to detect gerrymanders through geographical and statistical 
analysis. On the other hand, computers have been accused of 
enabling redistricting authorities to effortlessly achieve any 
nefarious goal. The reality is more complex: fully automated 
redistricting is constrained by deep mathematical, computational, 
and philosophical limits; sophisticated analysis of redistricting plans 
has yielded better predictions of districts’ electoral characteristics, 
but cannot serve as convincing “gerrymandering detectors.” 
Although these advanced map-drawing tools have undoubtedly 
made the process faster and cheaper, they have not led to any 
fundamental changes in redistricting outcomes. 
 In the last decade, another application of computing to 
redistricting has emerged—the use of computing infrastructure to 
increase public participation. This use has tremendous potential to 
improve the redistricting process because there are no fundamental 
technical challenges to its success. Establishing standards for 
accessibility and transparency, however, will be critical. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: COMPUTERS AND THE PROMISE OF IMPARTIAL 
REPRESENTATION 
“A computer does not substitute for judgment any more than a 
pencil substitutes for literacy. But writing ability without a pencil is 
no particular advantage.” 
 —Robert S. McNamara1 
All electoral systems aggregate voters’ choices into a collective 
outcome. Because no electoral system satisfies all values one might 
desire, the choice of electoral system ultimately embodies a 
preference among favored outcomes.2 District-based systems are 
distinct, however, in that they incorporate the judgment of 
professional political actors into the  vote aggregation mechanism  
vis-a-vis how individuals are partitioned within district boundaries. 
Districts created by these professionals can be defined to ensure 
representation for diverse communities: racial, geographical, 
economical, and political. 
In theory, allowing political actors to periodically redefine district 
boundaries improves the quality of representation. In practice, it is 
often the case that, as the old saw goes, in districting, politicians pick 
voters instead of the other way around. Thus, the inherent tension of 
district-based systems is that if the role of the professional is not 
constrained, representation suffers, but if it is constrained too much 
the system loses its distinctive characteristic—the ability to 
dynamically incorporate human professional judgments into the 
quality of representation. 
Over the six and a half decades since the creation of the first 
general purpose digital computer, computers successfully have 
conquered many problems that were once considered the exclusive 
domain of human experience despite the failure to create systems that 
are recognized as generally “intelligent.”3 Thus, it is perhaps 
unsurprising that many pose this question as a way to resolve the 
 
 1. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, THE ESSENCE OF SECURITY: REFLECTIONS IN OFFICE 115 
(1968). 
 2. Kenneth J. Arrow, A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare, 58 J. POL. ECON. 328, 
328–31 (1950). 
 3. See generally A.J. TAYLOR, WHAT EVERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNOW ABOUT 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1989). 
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inherent tension in district-based electoral systems: When it comes to 
redistricting, why not just let a computer do it? 
This question dates back to the 1960’s. William Vickrey was 
perhaps the first to propose taming gerrymandering through 
automation.4 Vickrey described an abstract algorithm for creating 
districts based only on population and proximity.5 Variants of this 
algorithm remain in use for redistricting research. For example, it is 
quite similar to an algorithm used by Carmon Cirincione, Thomas 
Darling, and Timothy O’Rourke four decades later.6 Later that 
decade, Stuart Nagel produced the first computer program for 
redistricting.7 Unlike Vickrey, Nagel did not claim a gerrymandering 
solution, rather he sought to measure value judgments in such a way 
to increase transparency and thereby facilitate productive debate.8 
Since these pioneering studies, many distinguished commentators 
have advocated computer automated redistricting, including: 
 President Ronald Reagan: “There is only one way to do 
reapportionment—feed into the computer all the factors 
except political registration.”9 
 The Supreme Court: “The rapid advances in computer 
technology and education during the last two decades 
make it relatively simple to draw contiguous districts of 
equal population [and] at the same time to further 
whatever secondary goals the State has.”10 
 Multiple journalists: “Use a computer program to draw 
congressional district boundaries—one with no input for 
political party, race, affluence, urbanization or any other 
parameter now used to stack the deck.”11 
 
 4. William Vickrey, On The Prevention of Gerrymandering, 76 POL. SCI. Q. 105 (1961). 
 5. Vickrey’s proposal never mentioned the word “computer,” but clearly implied the use 
of one. The algorithm described in the proposal was one that computers of the time could 
implement, and which would have been impractical in their absence. Id. 
 6. Carmen Cirincione, Thomas A. Darling & Timothy G. O’Rourke, Assessing South 
Carolina’s 1990s Congressional Districting, 19 POL. GEOGRAPHY 189 (2000). 
 7. For a description of the program, see Stuart Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer 
Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1965). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Tom Goff, Governor Urges Redistricting Plan Without Partisan Politics, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 21, 1972, at A3 (quoting then-Governor Ronald Reagan of California). 
 10. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983). 
 11. See, e.g., Joseph J. David, Jr., Let a Computer Do It, WASH. POST, May 21, 2003, at 
A32. 
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The idea of automating redistricting to reduce or eliminate 
gerrymandering is intuitively appealing, and is a recurrent theme in 
political science, geography, and law. Some notable examples include 
Evaluation and Optimization of Electoral Systems,12 an exploration of 
the subject by mathematicians, and Michelle Browdy’s student note 
on the subject in the Yale Law Journal.13 Computer programmers 
outside of academia also find this an appealing approach, such as 
George Clark and Brian Olsen, who created  software that draws 
compact districts.14 
Each decadal redistricting since 1960 brought with it tremendous 
advances in computing technology and repeated promises of electoral 
salvation by computer. The practical reality of what computers can do 
in redistricting, and how they have been used, has been somewhat 
different but, the potential for computers to introduce greater 
transparency and public participation into redistricting does appear to 
be a realistic, if more modest, goal. 
II. A TYPOLOGY OF COMPUTER USE IN REDISTRICTING 
The first proposed application of computing to redistricting was 
aimed entirely at removing humans from the redistricting process by 
introducing quantitative data to create ostensibly “impartial” 
redistricting plans. The initial applications tended to produce 
redistricting plans that did not make representational sense and thus 
were not seriously considered. These innovations, nevertheless, 
demonstrated that computers were useful tools to process large 
amounts of data necessary to conduct redistricting under measurable 
constraints such as—and most notably at the time—equal population. 
Rapidly, applications of computers in the redistricting process evolved 




 12. See generally Pietro GRILLI DI CORTONA ET AL., EVALUATION AND OPTIMIZATION OF 
ELECTORAL SYSTEMS (1999). 
 13. See generally Michelle H. Browdy, Note, Computer Models and Post-Banademer 
Redistricting, 99 YALE L.J. 1379 (1990). 
 14. See, e.g., GEORGE L. CLARK, STEALING OUR VOTES: HOW POLITICIANS CONSPIRE TO 
CONTROL ELECTIONS AND HOW TO STOP THEM (2004); Redistricter: A Non-Gerrymandered 
Impartial Redistricting Program, http:// code.google.com/p/redistricter/ (last visited Apr. 14, 
2010) 
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Table 1  
A typology of computer use in redistricting. 
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 15. See generally Roger F. Tomlinson, Computer Mapping: An Introduction to the Use of 
Electronic Computers in the Storage, Compilation and Assessment of Natural and Economic 
Data for the Evaluation of Marginal Lands, Proceedings of the National Land Capability 
Inventory Seminar (1962). 
 16. See generally Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael P. McDonald, From 
Crayons to Computers: The Evolution of Computer Use in Redistricting, 23 SOC. SCI. COMPUTER 
REV. 334 (2005). 
 17. Vickrey, supra note 4, at 105–10. 
 18. Altman et al., supra note 16. 
 19. Micah Altman, Is Automation the Answer: The Computational Complexity of 
Automated Redistricting, 23 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 81 (1997). 
 20. Stuart S. Nagel, Simplified Bipartisan Computer Redistricting, 17 STAN. L. REV. 863, 
863–69 (1965). 
 21. Micah Altman & Michael P. McDonald, BARD: Better Automated Redistricting, 34 J. 
STAT. SOFTWARE (forthcoming 2010). 
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 22. Altman, supra note 19. 
 23. Curtis C. Harris, Jr., A Scientific Method of Redistricting, 9 BEHAV. SCI. 219 (1964). 
 24. Ernest C. Reock, Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative 
Apportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. SCI. 70 (1961). 
 25. Edward R. Tufte, The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems, 67 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 540 (1973). 
 26. Frances Y. Edgeworth, Miscellaneous Applications of the Calculus of Probabilities, 51 J. 
ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y, 534, 534 (1898). 
 27. Bernard Grofman & Gary King, The Future of Partisan Symmetry as a Judicial Test for 
Partisan Gerrymandering after LULAC v. Perry, 6 ELECTION L.J. 2 (2007). 
 28. Micah Altman, A Bayesian Approach to Detecting Electoral Manipulation, 21 POL. 
GEOGRAPHY 39 (2002). 
 29. Altman et al., supra  note 16. 
 30. Id. 
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 The uses of computers in the redistricting process are summarized 
in Table 1. The goals most clearly distinguish each use, since the 
technologies and algorithms used to accomplish the goals overlap 
considerably. In the remainder of this section, we describe each of 
these goals in more detail and in the sections that follow we shall 
assess the state of the maturity of each: the development of 
geographic information systems, algorithms that provide for fully-
automated redistricting by a computer, algorithms that provide for 
semi-automated redistricting given some inputs from a user, methods 
to use computers to detect the presence of gerrymandering through 
violation of quantitative indicia, and how computers may be used to 
improve open access to the redistricting process. 
As applied to redistricting, the goal of geographic information 
systems (GIS) is to aid in the efficient creation of maps associated 
with data. In other words, GIS aims to support people in making 
decisions about districting. By itself, this is not controversial, but many 
have raised the concern that the manipulation of election data could 
make gerrymanders unprecedentedly easy to create and robust in 
effect. Thus, proponents of reform in this area of computing argue 
that the data available to professionals who use these systems should 
be artificially restricted to limit the ability to gerrymander by 
exploiting computer inputs. Iowa, for example, implements this 
reform strategy by preventing the legislature’s advisory redistricting 
commission from considering election data or the residence of 
incumbents while drawing districts.31 
The goal of automated redistricting is to eliminate unfairness. 
Proponents of automated redistricting argue that human judgments 
should be replaced by a set of neutral criteria such as equal 
populations, contiguity, and compactness within and across districts.32 
Many proponents for automated redistricting emphasize a particular 
neutral criterion, such as compactness,33 rather than a particular 
computer program or algorithm. Regardless, the core argument is the 
same—by automatically creating lines to optimize a particular pre-
specified set of criteria, we can retain a district-based system and 
 
 31. IOWA CODE § 42.4(5) (2008). 
 32. See generally Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The Third Criterion: Compactness 
as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 301 
(1991). 
 33. Id. at 301–02. 
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eliminate gerrymandering. A difficulty with this approach is that 
seemingly neutral criteria may lead to biased outcomes; indeed, 
criteria may be chosen with a specific political outcome in mind. 
The goal of semi-automated redistricting is to increase the 
transparency of the redistricting process.34 In contrast to fully 
automated redistricting, this approach leaves the selection of 
redistricting criteria to people, and delegates the creation of a plan 
that optimizes that chosen criteria to computers.35 Although both 
automatic and semi-automatic redistricting may sometimes use the 
same software and algorithms, fully automated redistricting 
algorithms and software are often highly-tailored to the particular 
criteria being advocated, whereas semi-automated algorithms must be 
sufficiently flexible to allow for a wide range of criteria to be 
effectively optimized. Thus, ironically, although the goals of semi-
automated redistricting are “lower” than those of automated 
redistricting, the costs are considerably higher due to the difficulty of 
designing and implementing this type of redistricting. 
The goal of quantitative indicia is to detect severe (if not all) 
gerrymanders based on districts’ geographic and demographic 
characteristics. Proponents have argued that various indicia are 
associated with the presence of gerrymandering: Most commonly, 
these indicia are based on some measure of geographic compactness36 
or on an output from the hypothetical seats-vote curve based on 
results from the proposed districts.37 Although some of these 
geographic criteria are theoretically calculable without a computer—
and were first calculated in the mid-1800’s—advances in computing 
have rendered a wider range of politically-plausible criteria to be 
calculated. It is easy, however, to conflate the prediction of electoral 
characteristics of plans with the detection of gerrymanders based on 
such predictions. The former has become fairly easy, whereas the 
latter remains deeply challenged. 
 
 34. See Nagel, supra note 20; Browdy, supra note 13, at 1387 (expanding upon Nagel’s 
argument). 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Micah Altman, Districting Principles and Democratic Representation (Mar. 31, 
1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, California Institute of Technology), available at http:// 
thesis.library.caltech.edu/1871/. 
 37. For a typology of these approaches, see generally Richard G. Niemi & John Deegan, 
Jr., A Theory of Political Districting, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1304 (1978). 
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Finally, advocates of using computers to facilitate public access to 
redistricting stress the advantages of transparency and public 
engagement. In an article written with Karin Mac Donald,38 we noted 
that in the 2000 round of redistricting, many states widely 
disseminated redistricting data and various proposed plans during the 
process for the first time. Some redistricting authorities considered 
publicly-drawn plans and encouraged public comments. Those 
supporting public access argued: “This change is tantalizing, since it 
suggests the potential for communities to examine the effects of plans 
on them, and to propose alternatives.”39 This public access aspect has a 
widely unrecognized potential to change the process of deliberation 
over districts by opening the door to wide public and interest group 
participation. 
III. GIS—UBIQUITOUS AND UNJUSTLY FEARED 
As computers have become more powerful, they have 
undoubtedly made it easier for redistricting authorities to create and 
evaluate more maps faster. At the same time, advances in 
communication technology have made it possible to gather fine-
grained data to micro-targeting district boundaries. Many editorials 
have decried that this acceleration of GIS technology and data 
collection caused unprecedentedly sophisticated gerrymanders. For 
example: 
 
 “Using powerful computers, line-drawers can now 
determine, with nearly scientific precision, how many loyal 
party voters need to be stuffed into any given district to 
make it impregnable.”40 
 “Mappers were able to specify a desired outcome or 
outcomes—the number of people in a district, say, or the 
percentage of Democrats in it—and have the program 
design a potential new district instantly. These systems 
allow redistricters to create hundreds of rough drafts easily 
 
 38. Altman et al., supra note 16. 
 39. Id. at 12. 
 40. Editorial, Elections With No Meaning, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2004, at A14. 
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and quickly, and to choose from among them maps that 
are both politically and aesthetically appealing.”41 
 “Gerrymandering is not self-regulating anymore . . . the 
software has become too good.”42 
 “With sophisticated computer programs, politicians can 
draw lines to maximize precisely their party’s 
representation and minimize the other’s. The result is sham 
legislative elections in which fewer and fewer seats are 
competitive and moderates of both parties get squeezed 
out of office.”43 
 
Despite these repeated observations, computer technology does 
not appear to be at fault.44 Gerrymandering existed even before 
Founding Father and namesake Governor Elbridge Gerry created a 
salamander-shaped Massachusetts state legislative district. Computers 
were primarily adopted as a redistricting tool much later, during the 
1990s round of redistricting. Examining early adopter states that 
could either afford the expensive computer systems or were not 
barred by state law from analyzing election data during redistricting 
shows there to be little correlation between gerrymandering and 
redistricting outcomes. 
Redistricting computer systems developed in the 1960s were 
innovative for their time, but did not provide a tool to quickly analyze 
calibrated changes in district boundaries with scientific precision. The 
units of geography analyzed by these programs were census tracts 
typically containing thousands of people, with data being entered on 
unwieldy punchcards. Resource-rich states began developing 
geographic information systems for redistricting purposes in the 
1980s. By the 1990s, some states reported that their in-house 
developed redistricting GIS programs running on mainframe 
computers or state-of-the-art workstations. The software development 
and the compilation of the election and census data to power the 
software cost an average of $500,000, with some of the larger states 
 
 41. Don Peck & Caitlin Casey, The Nation in Numbers: Packing, Cracking, and 
Kidnapping, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2004, at 50, 50–51. 
 42. Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab in THE BEST AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING 
2004 165, 165–76 (Royce Flippin ed., 2004). 
 43. Editorial, The Court Punts, WASH. POST, May 2, 2004, at B6. 
 44. Altman et al., supra note 16 (analyzing the rise of computer assisted redistricting). 
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reporting spending several millions of dollars on redistricting 
systems.45 
Ten years later, all states used redistricting software. The vast 
majority of states used commercially available programs capable of 
running on modestly-priced desktop computers, two orders of 
magnitude less expensive than a decade earlier.46 However, the core 
capabilities of these systems did not change radically. Like their 
predecessors, the 2000 systems simply allow redistricting authorities 
to draw districts at the block level using point-and-click technology 
and evaluate basic measures of redistricting plans like population 
balance, party registration balance, and a few measures of 
compactness. They did not provide access to advanced statistical 
models, or multi-criteria optimization. 
Another study we conducted with Karin Mac Donald did not find 
any statistical correlation between computer use, computer 
capabilities, or use of electoral data, and gerrymandered districts.47 
Moreover, the most dramatic changes in district competitiveness and 
compactness that occurred over the last forty years and preceded the 
widespread use of computers in the 1990s. Instead, the introduction of 
equal-population standards, which lead to the corrosion of use of 
whole counties, and the widespread use of block-level databases in 
the 1980s, appears to have been much more closely related to the 
increased ability of redistricting authorities to fine-tune districts.48 As 
Bruce Cain relates in his case study of California’s redistricting, a 
political guru like Phil Burton maintained a sophisticated database of 
California’s political landscape in his head and was able to sit down 
with pen and paper to gerrymander a complex state like California.49 
Computers are a useful gerrymandering tool, but they do not 
necessarily replace a skilled person in this instance. 
 
 45. Id. at 337. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Micah Altman, Karin Mac Donald & Michael P. McDonald, Pushbutton 
Gerrymanders, in PARTY LINES: COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL 
REDISTRICTING (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain eds., 2005). 
 48. Id. at 61–63. 
 49. Bruce E. Cain, Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
320, 323–24 (1985). 
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IV. FULLY AUTOMATIC REDISTRICTING—PROBABLY POSSIBLE, 
PHILOSOPHICALLY PRESUMPTUOUS 
 There is a story about a very senior political scientist and a world-
renowned scholar in the field of representation who traveled to 
Russia shortly after the fall of communism to lecture to the newly 
formed Duma. After speaking, a newly-minted member of the 
Duma approached him and asked him a question with great 
earnestness. 
 “I have been elected as a representative,” the Duma member 
asked, “so when I vote, should I vote the way I think the electors 
want me to, or should I vote the way I think is right?” 
 “That’s a good question,” said the sage. “Scholars have been 
studying this for two thousand years. And, let me just say, there are 
many opinions.”50 
 Although fully automated redistricting has been propounded for 
forty-five years, until very recently it has been an impractical process 
to pursue, except in the most limited circumstances. Even in the last 
round of redistricting, there was no publicly available computer 
software capable of automatically creating congressional districts 
meeting minimal legal standards for equal population and contiguity, 
and no state claims to have generated their districting plan through a 
fully automated process.51 
Times have changed. Although no commercial program is capable 
of automatic congressional redistricting, open source software 
projects are coming close to being able to provide this service for 
many states. The BARD system, for example, is being used 
experimentally to create contiguous, compact, equal-population 
districts using VTD’s and census tracts, yielding results that are 
suggestive, but not yet acceptable by de minimus population 
standards.  And the “redistricter” system52  is able to create districts 
using census blocs that are within one percent of equal population. 
Neither reliably can create districts with legal population deviance, 
nor would equipopulous, contiguous, and compact districts be 
sufficient in the small number of states, such as Ohio, that have strict 
 
 50. This is a true story. 
 51. See generally Altman et al., supra note 16. 
 52. Redistricter, supra note 14. 
DO NOT DELETE 6/9/2010  5:42:54 PM 
2010] PROMISE & PERILS IN REDISTRICTING 81 
 
requirements to minimize splits of county and other political 
boundaries. Notwithstanding this, the legality gap is narrowing rapidly 
for automated redistricting. 
 
Figure 1 















 There are, however, two important limitations to automated 
redistricting. The first limitation is mathematical: the problem of 
creating optimally compact, contiguous, equal-population districts is 
provably “NP-hard.”54 NP-hard partitioning problems are a class of 
problems generally considered by computer scientists and 
mathematicians to be computationally intractable55 and probably 
impossible to create a computer program that solves these problems 
optimally and reliably except in very small or limited cases. 
 
 53. BDistricting: What Districting is and What it Could be, http://bdistricting.com (last 
visited May 27, 2010). 
 54. Altman, supra note 19, at 137–48. 
 55. Lance Fortnow, The Status of the P versus NP Problem, 52 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE 
ACM 9, 80–81 (2009). For a formal treatment of NP-Completeness see CHRISTOS M. 
PAPADIMITRIOU, COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY 181–219 (1994) . 
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Redistricting is unlike the “hill-climbing” optimizers used to solve 
many statistical problems where there is clear path to the top of “hill,” 
indicating the best solution for a mathematical function. For even a 
modest-sized jurisdiction there are an infinite number of ways census 
blocks can be assigned to districts. Across this infinite terrain, there 
are many peaks and valleys that define a redistricting plan that has 
equal population and contiguous districts minimizing the number of 
split counties. Further, the objective function to optimize becomes 
more complex when additional federal and state criteria are 
introduced. In this situation with multiple local optima there is no 
simple way to ensure that a local optimum, obtained by rearranging 
census blocks into districts, is indeed the global optimum. 
The computational complexity of the redistricting problem is not 
limited to compact districts. Micah Altman showed that redistricting is 
computationally difficult even without optimal compactness.56 
Similarly, Clemens Puppe and Attlia Tasnadi showed that both 
optimal partisan gerrymanders and optimal partisan-unbiased 
redistricting are computationally hard as well.57 
As might be expected from the theoretical computational 
complexity of redistricting, scholars have been unsuccessful at 
creating methods that yield solutions to significant problems. The 
most successful of the exact solution methods—those based on 
integer-programming formulations—have advanced considerably 
over the last decade but are still limited to relatively small problems. 
In a recent study, a group of scholars solved a redistricting problem 
for a fixed set of redistricting criteria on a 30x30 grid.58 These authors 
speculated these methods could be extended up to a 50x50 grid. A 
typical state may have the equivalent of a 700x700 grid in absolute 
numbers of census blocks, but the blocks themselves typically do not 
align on a regular grid even in abstraction. Exact solution methods are 
additionally difficult or impossible to extend to arbitrary redistricting 
criteria. Integer programming, which is among the most general 
 
 56. Altman, supra note 19. 
 57. See generally Clemens Puppe & Attlia Tasnadi, Optimal Redistricting Under 
Geographical Constraints: Why “Pack and Crack” Does Not Work, 105 ECON. LETTERS 93 
(2009); Clemens Puppe & Attlia Tasnadi, A Computational Approach to Unbiased Districting, 
MATHEMATICAL & COMPUTER MODELING 1455 (2008). 
 58. See generally Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts, Erwin Eisinger, Gerard B.M. Heuvelink & Theodor 
J. Stewart, Using Linear Integer Programming for Multi-Site Land-Use Allocation, 35 
GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS 148 (2003). 
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formulations for which exact solution methods are commonly used, 
requires extensive expertise to reformulate complex redistricting 
criteria—such as that necessitated by the Voting Rights Act—into 
integer partition constraints. 
Because these problems are computationally intractable to 
general solutions, they are approached heuristically. Heuristics (or 
heuristic algorithms) are problem-solving procedures that, while they 
may yield acceptable results in practice, provide no guarantees of 
yielding “good” solutions in general. Specifically, an algorithm is 
heuristic if it cannot be shown to yield a correct result, or correct 
within a known error of approximation, or having a known 
probability of correctness. BARD, Redistricter, and every other 
program that has had even limited success in automated redistricting, 
use heuristics. 
Computational intractability is a fundamental theoretical 
limitation of automated redistricting and is problematic for semi-
automated approaches as well. The computational intractability might 
be overcome if the redistricting problem could be simplified greatly. 
For example, an optimal solution would not be necessary if (1) 
legitimate redistricting goals were limited to contiguity, equal 
population, and (some idiosyncratically-defined and approximate 
version of) compactness; (2) a system were developed yielded legal 
plans in practice; and (3) the plans by that system yielded were better 
than others proposed as measured by these agreed-upon criteria. If all 
of these elements come to fruition, then there might be widespread 
agreement that heuristics solutions were “good enough.” 
Unfortunately, no common agreement exists on the primacy of 
these goals or on the nature and measurement of representation. 
Even the political neutrality of these goals is contested, as there is 
evidence that compactness standards and others that emphasize 
geographic criteria can have distinct partisan effects where 
geographic patterns of support for each party differs.59 Justice 
Kennedy reflected on this reality in Vieth v. Jubelirer60 at the 
beginning of his concurrence: “The object of districting is to establish 
 
 59. See generally MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, THE MIDWEST MAPPING PROJECT (2009); 
Jason Barabas & Jennifer Jerit, Redistricting Principles and Racial Representation, 4 ST. & POL. 
Q. 415 (2004).  
 60. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 269 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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‘fair and effective representation for all citizens.’ . . . The lack, 
however, of any agreed upon model of fair and effective 
representation makes this analysis difficult to pursue.”61 
Political theory does not offer a clear solution either. Hanna 
Pitkin’s foundational scholarship, which identifies formalistic, 
symbolic, descriptive, and substantive aspects of representation, has 
influenced political theory,62 but the meaning, measurement, and 
current understanding of political representation remains complex, 
contested, and incomplete.63 
Legal and academic scholars suggest many plausible criteria for 
evaluating the quality of districts, none of which are commonly 
implemented in fully-automated redistricting systems. For example, 
social scientists have suggested that the following criteria, among 
others, should be incorporated in redistricting:64 
 
 Neutrality or symmetry of the projected seats-vote curve.65 
 Range of responsiveness or the range of possible vote 
shares across which electoral results would change.66 
 Competitiveness, maximizing the number of districts with 
competitive margins.67 
 Consumer surplus or minimize the number of votes for a 
losing candidate.68 
 Clustering, per se.69 
 Continuity of representative relationship, (implying some 
degree of incumbency protection).70 
 
 61. Id. 
 62. See generally HANNA F. PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION (1967). 
 63. See generally Nadia Urbanati & Mark E. Warren, The Concept of Representation in 
Contemporary Democratic Theory, 11 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 387 (2008). 
 64. See Jeanne C. Fromer, An Exercise in Line-Drawing: Deriving and Measuring Fairness 
in Redistricting, 93 GEO. L.J., 1547, 1576–86 (2005) (outlining the various criteria suggested for 
evaluating districts). 
 65. See generally Richard G. Niemi & John Deegan, Jr., A Theory of Political Districting, 
72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1304 (1978). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. THOMAS L. BRUNELL, REDISTRICTING AND REPRESENTATION: WHY COMPETITIVE 
ELECTIONS ARE BAD FOR AMERICA (2008). 
 69. See generally Roland G. Fryer, Jr. & Richard T. Holden, Measuring the Compactness of 
Political Redistricting Plans (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13,456, 2007). 
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 Non-quantitatively defined communities of interest.71 
 Further, states have these criteria:72 
o Coincidence with “major roads, streams, or other 
natural boundaries.” 
o Coincidence with census tract boundaries. 
o Being “square, rectangular or hexagonal in shape 
to the extent permitted by natural or political 
boundaries.” 
o Being “easily identifiable and understandable by 
voters”. 
o Facilitating “communication between a 
representative and his constituents.” 
o Preserving “media markets.” 
o Enhancing “opportunity for voters to know their 
representative and the other voters he represents.” 
o Aligning with “prior legislative boundaries.” 
o Consistency with “political subdivisions.” 
o Utilizing “vernacularly insular regions so as to 
allow for the representation of common interest.” 
 
If there was universal agreement on what “fair and effective 
representation” and how it should be measured, at least 
approximately, redistricting could be ‘automated’ even in the absence 
of computers. We would allow anyone to propose a plan, evaluate its 
representational quality using a priori agreed-upon measures, and 
pick the obvious winner at the close of an appointed period of time. A 
2010 Ohio House redistricting reform proposal illustrates this 
approach.73 Under the Ohio proposal, anyone can propose a plan, all 
submitted plans are evaluated for their representational quality (using 
a codified list of measures), and the best scoring plan will then be 
adopted. 
 
 70. See generally Nathaniel Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses: The Case for 
Judicial Acquiescence to Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649 (2002). 
 71. See generally Benjamin Forest, Information Sovereignty and GIS: The Evolution of 
“Communities of Interest” in Political Redistricting, 23 POL. GEOGRAPHY 425 (2004). 
 72. Roberto Casati, Cognitive Aspects of Gerrymandering, 20 TOPOI 203, 206–08 (2001). 
 73. H.J. Res. 15, 128th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2009-10). 
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Practically, automated redistricted systems are not driven by any 
recognized measure of district quality but by the inability to calculate 
measures of chosen district qualities. Calculating any measure of 
districts or a redistricting plan as a whole may require sifting through 
a large amount of data. These calculations can quickly become 
expensive, which limits the speed by which an algorithm can search 
for a solution. The commonly recognized compactness measures that 
are used in automated systems are typically modified ad-hoc or new 
measures are created without rigorous peer-review concerning their 
strengths and weaknesses so as to increase computational speed. 
Examples of the compromises and adaptations inherent in the more 
recent systems and algorithms include the following: 
 
Automatic redistricting to maximize voter homogeneity.74  This 
definition relies on maximizing the homogeneity of voters within 
districts. It is incompatible with many redistricting criteria, such as 
competitiveness, responsiveness, respecting the Voting Rights Act, 
and lack of bias. This algorithm assumes that voters can be 
assigned to districts individually (instead of only within census 
blocks), and may result in geographically non-contiguous districts 
that cannot guarantee optimality as self-defined. 
A q-state Pott’s model. This algorithm, used by Chung-I Chou and 
S.P. Li, treats redistricting as a physics problem—a q-state Pott’s 
model.75 This solution heuristically attempts to yield districts that 
are contiguous, compact, and of equal population. Inherent in this 
approach is the assumption that no other criteria are relevant and 
that compactness can be defined exclusively as total plan boundary 
minimization—a definition rarely used in practice. In addition, 
optimality is not guaranteed, and Chou and Li report successfully 
applying the problem to less than 450 population units 
Weighted Voronoi Diagrams. This heuristic algorithm for location 
districting (which is similar to political districting) is based on 
weighted Voronoi diagrams. It also implicitly defines compactness 
 
 74. See generally Gregory B. Lush, Esteban Gamez & Vladik Kreinovich, How to Avoid 
Gerrymandering: A New Algorithmic Solution, presented at the Eighth Annual Conference on 
Intelligent Technologies (Dec. 13, 2009), available at http://www.cs.utep.edu/vladik/2007/tr07-
51a.pdf. 
 75. See generally Chung-I Chou & S. P. Li, Taming the Gerrymander—Statistical Physics 
Approach to Political Districting Problem, 369 PHYSICA A: STAT. MECHANICS & ITS 
APPLICATIONS 799 (2006). 
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as boundary minimization.76 
A shortest split-line algorithm. This algorithm splits area 
jurisdiction with alternating horizontal and vertical lines until 
districts approximately equal in population are developed. This 
yields districts that are roughly rectangular but not necessarily 
compact by any recognized measure. Nor does it allow for any 
other criteria to be incorporated. Even with these limitations, the 
districts produced still vary by five percent of the population, 
which is larger than allowed for congressional districts.77 
An ad-hoc heuristic method that allowed a two-fold population 
difference between the largest and smallest methods. When 
Toshihiro Sakaguchi and Junichiro Wada tried to use this 
algorithm to automatically redistrict the Japanese Diet, it failed to 
find an optimal solution once the number of population units 
exceeded twenty.78 
A system using mixed-integer programming heuristics. Although 
this family of heuristics is flexible enough to incorporate multiple 
criteria, only population equality, contiguity, and compactness were 
incorporated. This approach sought to achieve compactness by 
minimizing the maximum distance between two points in a district. 
Plans were generated for the nation as a whole and divided into 
less than a thousand population units for four multi-state districts. 
Even under these theoretical (and unrealistic) conditions, the 
system was unable to produce district plans that were well-
balanced in population when the number of districts in a plan 
exceeded four. 79 
An ad-hoc randomized heuristic algorithm that did not explicitly 
incorporate population or compactness. When used to partially 
redistrict the North Carolina, it could only produce partial district 
 
 76. Id. See generally Antonio G.N. Novaes, J.E. Souza de Cursi, Arinei C.L. da Silva & 
João C. Souza, Solving Continuous Location-Districting Problems with Voronoi Diagrams, 36 
COMPUTERS & OPERATIONS RES. 40 (2009) (providing a heuristic algorithm). 
 77. See generally Pan Kai, Tan Yue & Jiang Sheng, The Study of a New Gerrymandering 
Methodology (Aug. 16, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with University of Science & 
Technology of China). 
 78. Toshihiro Sakaguchi & Junichiro Wada, Automating the Districting Process: An 
Experiment Using a Japanese Case Study in REDISTRICTING IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
237, 242–50 (Lisa Handley & Bernard Grofman eds., 2008). 
 79. See generally Takeshi Shirabe, District Modeling with Exact Contiguity Constraints, 35 
ENV’T & PLAN. 1 (2009). 
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plans using grouped counties as population units. 80 
A k-means minimization heuristic. “Redistricter” is a heuristic 
algorithm that essentially attempts to create districts where the 
component population units are closest to one another. There is no 
guarantee that any k-means heuristic algorithm will find the 
optimal configuration of population units into districts within a 
finite amount of time. Redistricter has undocumented 
modifications, and uses an ad-hoc combination of heuristics to 
“solve” the problem.81 
 
In theory, fully-automated redistricting merely implements 
unambiguous redistricting criteria in the service of accepted 
representational goals. In practice, fully-automated redistricting 
criteria are modified for the sake of computational speed and to 
encode the representational goals of the system designer. Thus, fully-
automated redistricting solutions put the proverbial cart before the 
proverbial horse. 
V. SEMI-AUTOMATED REDISTRICTING—PROBABLY PROBLEMATIC, 
POSSIBLY USEFUL 
Semi-automatic redistricting avoids the deep philosophical 
problem faced by fully-automated redistricting. Rather than hard-
wire contested representational goals into the software, semi-
automatic redistricting aims to be agnostic as to the choice of goals. 
The redistricting authority chooses criteria, and the software merely 
needs to find the optimal arrangement of districting division 
according to the chosen criteria. In theory, semi-automated 
redistricting increases transparency by moving the debate away from 
boundary line disputes to debates about the representational and 
legal constraints posed by such boundary divisions. And, in theory, the 
boundary lines are simply a consequence of these higher-level 
decisions. 
Semi-automated redistricting is not so easy for two reasons. The 
first reason is mathematical—optimization of almost any interesting 
representational criteria is likely to be NP-hard. There is currently no 
 
 80. See generally David W. Peterson, Putting Chance to Work: Reducing the Politics in 
Political Redistricting, 21 CHANCE 1 (2008). 
 81. Redistricter, supra note 14. 
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known way of systematically determining the extent to which plans 
generated by any particular NP-hard heuristic are “close” to the 
optimum achievable. Further, many heuristics require a priori choices 
for starting points (e.g. an existing districting plan), and the results are 
sensitive to that choice. Since no heuristics work equally well for all 
problems, any requirement to use a particular software package or set 
of algorithms may create a hidden bias in favor of specific criteria.82 
This bias is not merely theoretical. For example, Frederica Ricci 
and Bruno Simeone used several different general heuristics on the 
same set of optimization problems and found that one of these 
heuristics was much better than the others in achieving the goal of 
compactness.83 Similarly, a study using three general heuristics for the 
same school-districting plan84 found that the choice of starting points 
(seed values) dramatically affected the quality of the plans.85 
Currently, the only openly available system for semi-automated 
redistricting is BARD, a system we developed. BARD provides 
methods to create, display, compare, edit, automatically refine, 
evaluate, and profile political districting plans. BARD aims to provide 
a framework for scientific analysis of redistricting plans and to 
facilitate wider public participation in the creation of new plans. Since 
redistricting is a computationally complex partitioning problem not 
amenable to an exact optimization solution, BARD implements a 
variety of selectable meta-heuristics that can be used to refine existing 
or randomly generated redistricting plans based on user-determined 
criteria. By assigning different weights to various criteria, such as 
district compactness or equality of population, BARD supports 
automated generation of redistricting plans and plan-profiling. These 
functions permit exploration of trade-offs among criteria. The intent 
of a redistricting authority may be explored by examining these trade-
offs and examining why some reasonably observable plans were not 
adopted. Although we are enthusiastic about BARD, it has not solved 
the computational tractability problem. The use of multiple meta-
 
 82. See generally D.H. Wolpert & W.G. Macready, No Free Lunch Theorems for 
Optimization, 1 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON EVOLUTIONARY COMPUTATION 67 (1997). 
 83. See generally Federica Ricci & Bruno Simeone, Local Search Algorithms for Political 
Districting, 189 EUR. J. OPERATIONAL R. 1409 (2008). 
 84. The optimization problem induced by school districting is similar but not identical to 
that of political districting. 
 85. See generally Marie desJardins et al., Heuristic Search and Information Visualization 
Methods for School Redistricting, 28 AI MAGAZINE 59 (2007). 
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 The second reason automated redistricting is difficult is that in 
practice there is a large gap between identifying representational 
values and creating criteria reflecting those values that can be 
optimized in a computer. Even conceptually simple values like 
“contiguity” require a host of technical choices when fed into a 
computer. Is a district contiguous if it is connected in some place only 
by telephone lines? By areas containing roads but not people? By 
areas containing no land (with or without bridges)? Are two districts 
contiguous if they cross each other at one or more points, or if one 
entirely contains the other? When measuring compactness, which of 
the dozens of standards should be used? Should entirely unpopulated 
areas be counted? Should areas covered by water be excluded or 
apportioned to neighboring land units? How should map orientation 
and scale be selected? The answer to each of these questions may 
yield substantially different outcomes, all of which could be claimed 
to yield the “best” contiguous, compact, equal-population district. 
Although semi-automated approaches foster transparency, these 
approaches also can easily obscure it if the computer algorithms are 
not designed and documented carefully. These obstacles warrant 
caution, but they may be accounted for if there is sufficient flexibility 
and transparency in the redistricting process. Allowing a range of 
semi-automated systems using open-source documented algorithms, 
open criteria, and publicly available data may help redistricting 
authorities find plans that better meet their stated goals and better 
articulate why they chose a particular plan. Current commercially 
available automated systems, however, are closed, black box systems 
that do not lend themselves to verification that criteria were 
implemented correctly and do not enable advocates for new criteria 
to incorporate their recommendations into the software. 
VI. QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION—RELIABLE PREDICTION, NOT 
CAUSAL LINKAGE 
Redistricting criteria often are advocated as methods of detecting 
or limiting gerrymandering. Violations of criteria may reveal 
improper manipulation of districts, and such gerrymandering may be 
limited by requiring redistricting authorities to draw districts subject 
to certain prophylactic constraints. Although the use of redistricting 
criteria preceded the development of computers, computers have 
enabled a more expansive set of criteria to be calculated, including a 
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set of statistical methods that provide relatively robust predictions of 
the hypothetical electoral outcomes expected to arise from proposed 
redistricting plans. 
These criteria are typically quantitative, facially objective, strongly 
propounded by their advocates (at least for a time), and generally fall 
into three categories. The first category is a neutral proxy that 
correlates with (at least extreme) gerrymanders, and is otherwise 
“ostensibly” neutral. Compactness standards most often are 
propounded on this basis. The second category of criteria predicts 
probable electoral outcomes of redistricting plans. Among the many 
criteria in this category that have been proposed, Andrew Gelman’s 
and Gary King’s bias and responsiveness indices have received the 
most recent scholarly recognition.87 The third set of criteria, which are 
more rarely used, aim to detect gerrymandering directly to reveal 
where a redistricting authority intended to achieve an improper goal 
in creating a district plan. Advances in computer technology have 
rendered a wide variety of criteria in each of these categories 
relatively easy to calculate. Computers, however, have not helped 
overcome inherent limitations associated with each type. 
The fundamental limitation of the first type of criterion is 
neutrality. We say these criteria are “ostensibly” neutral because 
legislators and others in the public policy sphere have a long history 
of advocating prima facie neutral reasons and methods which are in 
fact chosen to achieve politically-motivated goals.88 Consider, for 
example, the 1973 racial gerrymander of Mississippi county 
supervisors’ districts, chronicled by Frank Parker and illustrated 
below.89 In response to Allen v. State Board of Elections,90 which 
invalidated at-large elections for Mississippi’s county supervisors, 
Hinds County officials drew districts with the goal of equalizing 
population, land area, county road mileage, and the number of bridges 
(road maintenance was one of the responsibilities of county 
 
 87. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral 
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994). 
 88. Robert Nozick uses the term “second-level bias” to refer to this selection of standards 
or procedures, which will be applied evenly, but which are chosen to advantage a particular 
group. ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 103–05 (1994). 
 89. FRANK R. PARKER, BLACK VOTES COUNT: POLITICAL EMPOWERMENT IN MISSISSIPPI 
AFTER 1965 155–66 (1990). 
 90. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
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supervisors).91 Although these goals are facially neutral, the effect of 
their application was not:92 simultaneously equalizing road mileage 
and population created districts that split the major city in Hinds 
County, where African-American voters were concentrated, and 
resulted in a racial gerrymander.93 
 
Figure 3 
Hinds County Supervisor’s Districts Adopted by the Count Board of Supervisors 






















 91. PARKER, supra note 89, at 153–56. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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Compact districts may advantage groups or political parties 
supported by geographically-dispersed populations, a scenario 
referred to in both the dissent and concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer.95 
Respecting existing political boundaries may also produce bias by a 
similar mechanism.96 An important caveat is that these generalizable 
outcomes may not be applicable to all redistricting scenarios in all 
jurisdictions. Drawing compact districts may result in different 
outcomes in a state with several small to mid-sized cities compared to 
a state with a large metropolis. 
The second set of indicia is best represented by what Richard 
Niemi and John Deegan called “neutrality,”97 and by what Bernard 
Grofman and Gary King refer to as “partisan symmetry.”98 These 
indicia are based on the seats–votes relationship. This empirical 
relationship, first described by F.Y. Edgeworth99 and interpreted as a 
measure of electoral manipulation by Edward Tufte,100 has been 
formalized and estimated in different ways.101  The most popular of 
these methods currently is derived from predictions of how changes in 
the statewide average district vote for a political party’s candidate will 
translate into an expected statewide fraction of seats for the political 
party. As Grofman and King argue, advances in statistical methods 
(made practical by faster computers) now allow relatively easy and 
reliable estimates of these quantities.102 
The prediction of plans’ electoral characteristics may be easily 
conflated with the detection of gerrymandering based on these 
estimates. Whereas calculating these estimates has become fairly easy, 
using them to detect gerrymandering remains deeply challenged. The 
fundamental limitation of these criteria is that, as Gelman and King 
explain, they are predictive, not causal models, and are formally 
unrelated to gerrymandering. For example, non-zero bias and low 
 
 95. See generally Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on 
Partisan Gerrymanders, 17 POL. GEOGRAPHY 989 (1998) (citing Vieth v. Jubelirer, 542 U.S. 267 
(2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 96. MCDONALD, supra note 59. 
 97. Niemi & Deegan, supra note 37, at 1304–08. 
 98. Grofman & King, supra note 27. 
 99. Edgeworth, supra note 26. 
 100. Tufte, supra note 25. 
 101. See generally William LeBlanc, Party Positions and the Seats/Votes Relationship with 
Ideological Voters (Aug. 6, 2007) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology), available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/42388. 
 102. Grofman & King, supra note 27. 
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responsiveness (in the Gelman–King sense) may result from causes 
other than partisan gerrymandering, such as: geographic constraints, 
attempts at reducing the majoritarian-winner bonus (arguably 
increasing fairness) in situations where the normal vote is not 
expected to be fifty percent, a change in the proportion or location of 
moderate voters, or the pursuit of other legitimate goals.103 To be 
useful in policy, predictive redistricting criteria must carry a 
substantive interpretation. For example, Grofman and King state that 
they view measures of partisan symmetry as a “substantive standard 
of fairness in districting” and not as evidence of improper intent to 
create a gerrymander.104 However, courts have rejected the pursuit of 
bias and responsiveness exclusive to other redistricting criteria.105 
Additionally, as discussed in the previous section, neither the courts 
nor social scientists have reached consensus on what predictive 
criteria should apply. 
The third category (intended to detect gerrymandering by a 
redistricting authority) avoids the limitations posed by the first two by 
focusing directly on the likelihood that a plan was caused by an 
improper motive—whether or not the plan is actually a classic 
gerrymander. Formally, this can be framed as a Bayes’ factor test, 
which measures the ratio of the probability that the plan would have 
particular characteristics, such as the number of Democratic seats, 
based on the redistricting authority’s purely partisan motives over the 
probability that a plan would have the same characteristics 
conditioned on a permissible motive. 
Unfortunately, although such tests are easy to formulate, they are 
impossible to estimate because the distribution of plans under each 
outcome is unknown, and it is not possible to sample or simulate from 
it. Because redistricting is an NP-hard problem, it is not tractable to 
enumerate the population of possible districting plans of any 
reasonable size. As a consequence, no known algorithm can provide a 
 
 103. See generally Andrew Gelman & Gary King, A Unified Method of Evaluating Electoral 
Systems and Redistricting Plans, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 513 (1994); J.M. Kousser, Estimating the 
Partisan Consequences of Redistricting Plans—Simply, 22 LEG. STUD. Q. 521 (1996); see also 
LeBlanc, supra note 101 (illustrating an innovative formal analysis). 
 104. Grofman & King, supra note 27, at 9–13. 
 105. League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 420 (2006) 
(“Without altogether discounting its utility in redistricting planning and litigation, we conclude 
asymmetry alone is not a reliable measure of unconstitutional partisanship.”). 
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truly random sample of districting plans (set partitions).106 Moreover, 
it is unlikely that such an algorithm exists, as its presence would imply 
that NP-hard decision problems could be solved using randomization, 
which is widely believed to be false. 
Instead, current criteria based on “random” samples of districts 
use heuristics similar to the automated redistricting algorithms 
discussed above. Heuristics provide no formal guarantees of 
outcomes’ characteristics and are always presumably biased toward 
some sort of outcome. Although the direction of the bias may be 
impossible to determine, this is more than a theoretical problem. 
Several recently published studies have drawn unsupportable 
inferences about the characteristics of redistricting plans based on 
random districting. 
A study of South Carolina concludes that the state was racially 
gerrymandered in the 1990s because their “random” redistricting 
heuristics failed to produce plans that yielded the same number of 
minority seats as the actual plan.107 This conclusion is not a valid 
statistical inference, as there is no reason to believe that the 
“randomized” method produced a set of plans that constituted an 
unbiased random sample of possible compact, contiguous, equal-
population districting plans.108 Further, the analysis rejects only the 
hypothesis that the actual plan is not a plan drawn based solely on 
traditional districting criteria. It does not reject other plausible 
hypotheses that are different from gerrymandering—for example, that 
the actual plan is a random sample of plans based on other legitimate 
non-racial factors, such as moderate partisanship, communities of 
 
 106. Our lengthy search of the computer science literature revealed a single method for 
producing partitions of sets with a known (in this case, uniform) random sampling distribution. 
These methods were invented over twenty years ago, see generally ALBERT NIJENHUIS & 
HERBERT S. WILF, COMBINATORIAL ALGORITHMS (1975), but are not well known. In theory, it 
is trivial to adapt these methods to sample redistricting plans using the rejection sampling 
method—sampling partitions at random, rejecting any that do not constitute feasible 
redistricting plans (because of violation of contiguity, population constraints, etc.) and using the 
remainder to estimate the distribution of redistricting plans. Unfortunately, in practice this 
approach is computationally intractable, since as the number of blocs in the plan gets larger the 
ratio of feasible plans to random partitions grows exponentially smaller, and the execution time 
for calculating the distribution continues to grow. 
 107. See generally Cirincione et al., supra note 6. 
 108. Although bias is an inevitable result of the use of heuristics, in this case the direction of 
bias in small samples can be readily demonstrated. The appendix shows how enumeration of all 
feasible redistricting plans on a 3x2 grid demonstrates how this heuristic rule biases towards the 
creation of compact districts, even though compactness is not a stated criterion of the heuristic. 
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interest, and protection of incumbents. Thus the analysis makes an 
unwarranted causal inference that gerrymandering caused the 
discrepancy. 
A study of Japanese districting concludes that the Japanese Diet 
was gerrymandered because the districting plan differed in 
characteristics from those created by their heuristic.109 This analysis 
makes errors in statistical and causal inference identical to the South 
Carolina study. 
A study of the United States House of Representatives draws 
inferences about the effect of redistricting on congressional 
polarization from a set of districts created by randomly allocating 
split-county units to districts without replacement.110 Split-counties are 
formed by dividing counties into whole numbers of 10,000 person 
blocks and discarding remainders. Although this is a purely random 
sample, and hence unbiased, it does not sample from the population 
of legal districting plans. Instead it includes non-contiguous plans and 
plans that are of unequal population and excludes legal plans created 
from census tracts and blocks. The authors are aware of this problem 
and use ad-hoc adjustments to this method to attempt to correct it, 
but the amount and direction of bias and how it affects their 
conclusions are indeterminate. 
One of the most prominent computer science textbooks warns 
against a similar assumption when designing random number 
generators.111 Another textbook cautions quite specifically, 
“Generating random permutations [and other combinatoric objects] 
is an important little problem that people stumble upon and often 
botch up. . . you must be very careful with random [combinatorial] 
generation. We recommend that you try reasonably extensive 
experiments with any random generator before believing it.”112 In 
other words, it is trivial to create an algorithm that does “‘random 
things,”’ but it is risky to assume that such arbitrary behavior 
produces statistically random results. 
 
 109. Sakaguchi & Wada, supra note 78. 
 110. See generally Nolan M. McCarthy, Keith Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does 
Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666 (2009). 
 111. DONALD E. KNUTH, 2 THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING: SEMINUMERICAL 
ALGORITHMS 4–6 (3d ed. 1997). 
 112. STEVE SKIENA, THE ALGORITHM DESIGN MANUAL 248 (1998). 
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VI. OPEN REDISTRICTING—THE NEXT WAVE 
The next major change in the use of computers in redistricting will 
be centered on systems that enable the public to participate in the 
map drawing process. If the potential of automated redistricting and 
its variants cannot be achieved due to theoretical and computational 
constraints, perhaps computing advances can be leveraged to 
implement more modest goals. 
The idea that software, and mapping software in particular, can 
enhance public participation dates back to at least the 1960s, as 
previously discussed. In the last decade, however, a number of 
geographers have begun to crystallize the notion of “participatory” 
GIS systems, and to study “public participation GIS” more 
systematically.113 In the last several years, Google’s release of the 
Google Map service and related advances in online mapping have led 
to more interest in what is now more colloquially known as 
“collaborative” or “social” mapping. 
Limited attempts at participatory redistricting pre-date the 
widespread use of GIS systems. In the 1990s, some states attempted to 
mitigate barriers to public participation in redistricting by providing a 
public computer terminal, typically located at a state library or state 
office, loaded with the necessary software and data to draw districts.114 
However, it was not until shortly after 2000 that GIS systems became 
sufficiently inexpensive to contemplate their large-scale public use in 
redistricting.115 
Of the eighteen states that reported providing public terminals in 
2000, Arizona illustrates the potential benefits that public 
participation in the redistricting process provide, as well as the 
barriers that may exist. Although Arizona provided a public terminal, 
only two well-organized interest groups presented complete 
congressional plans to the Arizona Independent Redistricting 
Commission: the Coalition for Fair Redistricting—an alliance of 
minority groups—and Democratic state legislative members, lead by 
 
 113. See generally Renee Sieber, Public Participation Geographic Information Systems: A 
Literature Review and Framework, 96 ANNALS OF THE ASS’N OF AM. GEOGRAPHERS 491 
(2006). 
 114. Altman et al., supra note 16. 
 115. See id. 
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Democratic Congressman Ed Pastor. 116 Still, these plans, along with 
testimony from other members of the public, had an impact on 
Arizona’s adopted redistricting plan. Perhaps the most apparent 
effect was observed in the First Congressional district, where 
Arizona’s northwest communities are connected with the Hopi 
Reservation in the northeast corner of the state by a narrow neck 
extending through the Grand Canyon. This oddly-shaped district was 
drawn at the urging of representatives of the Hopi tribe, who did not 
wish to have the same representation as their traditional enemies 
(and the more numerous) Apache, who live in a reservation that 
surrounds the Hopi. 
In contrast to the very small number of maps created by the public 
in the last round of redistricting, a simplified “redistricting game” 
probably has led to more people drawing (hypothetical) redistricting 
maps in the last three years than in the entire history of the nation. 
Released in 2007 by creator Chris Swain of the USC Game 
Innovation Lab, this redistricting system is interested in redistricting if 
provided with a user-friendly means to participate.117 
 
 
 116. Reporter’s Transcript of Proceedings for Public Session on July 17, 2001, Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, http://www.azredistricting.org/Meetings/ 
PDF/AIRCTranscriptsPublicSession7-17-01.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2010); see Arizona 
Independent Redistricting Commission, Meetings & Transcripts, http://www.azredistricting.org/ 
?page=meetings (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (providing the comprehensive transcripts of all 
AIRC meetings). 
 117. See Michael Falcone, A Gamers Guide to Redistricting, THE CAUCUS, June 14, 2007, 
http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/06/14/a-gamers-guide-to-redistricting/. 
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Figure 4 
















A recent Ohio mapping exercise illustrates the potential of 
adapting this approach to real redistricting plans. In the summer of 
2009, the Ohio Secretary of State’s office found that there may be 
greater public interest in mapping redistricting plans than the Arizona 
experience indicates. The Secretary of State’s office held a 
redistricting competition, inviting the public to draw and submit 
congressional plans evaluated on several criteria based on 2000 
census data.118 Three of the fourteen submitted maps—two from Ohio 
citizens and one from an Illinois state legislator and physics professor 
named Mike Fortner—were declared “‘winning’” plans in that they 
satisfied threshold criteria values.119 Although three plans were 
rejected because they did not have an African American majority 
district, all fourteen scored as politically fairer (under the Ohio 
 
 118. See Ohio Secretary of State, Ohio Redistricting Competition, http:// 
www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Text.aspx?page=12303 (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (explaining the 
Ohio Secretary of State’s redistricting competition). 
 119. Id. 
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Secretary of State’s measure) than the bipartisan congressional plan 
adopted by the state legislature. 
Compared to the redistricting game, the Ohio competition 
attracted few participants. Yet the set of plans it created suggest that 
by opening up the redistricting process more broadly to encourage 
citizen participation, it is possible to discover a menu of legal 
redistricting plans that are “fair” by nominally objective standards 
advocated by various proponents of reform.120  By disseminating these 
alternative plans, redistricting authorities may change their behavior 
by using suggested district configurations to aid in fashioning their 
own plans, or by reacting to media scrutiny shaming them into 
producing a better plan than they might have otherwise. 
Scholarly study of public participation GIS systems suggests that it 
is useful to characterize participation as having different levels of 
involvement and influence, ranging from observation to joint public 
control.121 The last round of redistricting saw some increase in 
observation in the lowest level of involvement, as measured by “hits” 
on state redistricting websites disseminating data and other 
information. While we do not expect to see collaborative redistricting 
systems that give the public joint control over the process in the near 
future, we do believe that the level and quality of participation can be 
“upgraded.” Using collaborative redistricting systems, the public can 
take an active role in the public dialogues and deliberations over 
redistricting. 
We envision that with an open online redistricting system, public 
interest groups could draw and actively lobby for their maps, and 
courts would no longer need to choose between only the maps 
offered to them by the political parties during litigation. Academic 
scholars and expert witnesses could use the program to explore 
hypothetical scenarios to test the motivations and outcomes of 
redistricting. Perhaps even politicians would be interested in the 
software as a means to remove “politics” from the process. However, 
on this last point, we should not be blind to the prospect of politicians 
using the program to help maximize their political goals. 
 
 120. Altman & McDonald, supra note 21. 
 121. Sieber, supra note 113, at 500–01 
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VII. THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY IN “OPEN” SYSTEMS 
Wherever political systems are readily manipulated, it is better to 
have ten thousand eyes watching than twenty. The drawing of electoral 
districts is among the most frequently manipulated and least 
transparent processes in democratic governance. All too often 
redistricting authorities maintain their monopoly on the process by 
imposing high costs to public participation. By providing the public 
with information similar to that held by official decisionmakers, 
increasing transparency and public participation can be a powerful 
counterbalance to this monopoly on redistricting districts. This 
information can lead to different outcomes and better representation. 
The redistricting process does not need to be closed to the public. 
Transparency can be facilitated through greater access to resources by 
interested outsiders, and redistricting authorities can encourage public 
participation through formal requests for public comment and the 
consideration of publicly submitted redistricting plans. The optimal 
redistricting plan may not be discoverable, but open redistricting may 
produce a “better” outcome through the exploration of a menu of 
redistricting plans generated by the public (or automated methods) 
and through robust public debate over these plans’ goals. In this 
manner, the adopted plan may not necessarily be the one created 
behind closed doors that embodies only the preferences of political 
professionals. 
Increasing openness has many direct benefits. Openness can aid in 
educating the public about the electoral process, empowering them to 
participate in a process that engages them in shaping the 
representation of their neighborhoods and communities, permiting 
them to show legislators plans they support, and promoting broad  
commentary and discussion. 
Fostering public participation enables the public to identify their 
neighborhoods and communities, promotes the creation of alternative 
plans, and facilitates an exploration of a wide range of 
representational possibilities. Publicly-drawn plans can provide a 
measuring stick against which an official plan may be compared, and 
promote the creation of a “market” for plans that support political 
fairness and the representational goals of the community. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TRANSPARENCY 
Complex systems are inherently difficult to make transparent. As 
explained above, automated redistricting systems often give the 
appearance of clarity while embedding bias in technical details. 
Similarly, web-based redistricting software, if not thoughtfully 
implemented and deployed, could create impressions of accessibility 
and transparency that are merely illusory. Software and systems that 
are used to analyze or generate plans, or reports based on that 
software, can be impossible to reproduce or correctly interpret 
without access to the code used to generate them. Thus, transparency 
requires that: 
 
 Software used to automatically create or improve 
redistricting plans that are either open-source or provide 
documentation sufficient for a third party to replicate the 
results using independently developed software. 
 Reports analyzing redistricting plans include 
documentation of data, methods, and procedures sufficient 
to allow a third party to verify the report. 
 
It is becoming widely recognized that software transparency is 
required for scientific replication purposes,122 trusted systems,123 and 
the transparency of government actions relying heavily on computer 
systems, such as electronic voting.124 Because the technical definitions 
of redistricting criteria are so complex and varied, it is critical to 
document the exact algorithms used when determining contiguity, 
measuring compactness, “optimizing” districts, and measuring 
competitiveness. Because the goals of redistricting evolve with our 
understanding of representation, it is critical to allow the public to 
modify the tools used for redistricting in order to better adapt them to 
their own views of representation. 
 
 122. See generally MICAH ALTMAN, JEFF GILL & MICHAEL P. MCDONALD, NUMERICAL 
ISSUES IN STATISTICAL COMPUTING FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENTIST (2003). 
 123. See generally Rebecca T. Mercuri, Trusting in Transparency, 48 COMM. OF THE ACM 
15 (2005). 
 124. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 141–43 (2006). 
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Without the ability to inspect redistricting software, it will be 
impossible to verify that algorithms for creating or evaluating plans 
are implemented correctly. Without a license to modify and reuse the 
software, the system can only accommodate a limited set of 
representational goals. Without access to previous versions of the 
code, it will be impossible to replicate earlier versions of the code. 
Distribution of code under an open source license through a well-
known repository, such as Sourceforge, solves these problems: an 
open source license establishes the rights to inspect the code and to 
build new tools with it and the repository captures the history of 
changes to the system. 
Still, without data, software for creating and analyzing plans is 
useless. Yet state redistricting authorities can, with modest effort, 
make available online a wealth of information that would 
substantially lower the barriers to public participation in a 
transparent manner. It is technically feasible for states to maintain 
websites that provide access to redistricting data, proposed 
redistricting plans, and software that enables the public to create their 
own community maps and entire redistricting plans. 
Some data is already readily available. The population data used 
for redistricting purposes is known as the PL94-171 file—named after 
the federal public law mandating its release. The Census Bureau 
provides online access to the geographic and population information 
necessary to use this data for redistricting purposes. In some instances, 
however, redistricting authorities may further adjust or enhance these 
geographic and population data sets. For example, state law could 
require that geographic entities not found in the Census Bureau’ be 
respected during the redistricting process, such as townships or 
communities of interest. Alternatively, a state may adjust population 
counts by excluding military, students, or prisoners from their 
calculations. Most states except those with specific prohibitions 
enhance their population data by merging it with election returns so 
probable election outcomes may be forecasted. 
Creating and evaluating redistricting plans requires access not 
only to demographic data but to community, and in many cases, 
electoral data, as well. The public needs equal access to this data to 
participate in plan creation and to verify claims made about official 
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plans. To determine what is necessary to guarantee transparency, we 
need only look to the science,125 in which replication and verification 
are fundamental requirements. Thus, all data needed to create legal 
redistricting plans should be distributed for public use, under a license 
allowing reuse of the data for non-commercial purposes. Further, to 
ensure that data have not been intentionally or unintentionally 
modified in such a manner as to affect the redistricting outcomes, all 
data should provide clear documentation of the original source, the 
chain of ownership (provenance), and all modifications made to it. 
The public needs easy access to the redistricting plans generated 
by a redistricting authority or submitted by the public in order to 
evaluate these plans. Redistricting plans released as images of districts 
or by describing how districts’ borders align with existing features—
known as “‘metes and bounds”‘—are difficult to import into mapping 
software. Full transparency thus requires that redistricting plans be 
made available in non-proprietary formats that are easily read into 
commonly used GIS systems. 
Finally, on the Internet, as the joke goes, “no one knows you’re a 
dog.” Websites and online service must be transparent to be 
trustworthy. Services offered to the public to evaluate or create 
redistricting plans are opaque and subject to misinterpretation unless 
adequately documented. Transparency requires that such sites and 
services provide a clear privacy policy; offer users the ability to 
publish plans and make available all published plans in non-
proprietary, machine analyzable formats; and provide documentation 
of any organizations providing significant contributions to the 
operation of the service. 
IX. PROMOTING PARTICIPATION 
Even the most transparent redistricting computer system will not 
curb gerrymandering if it is not used. Surveys consistently find that 
the public has little knowledge about the most basic components of 
the redistricting process.126 For a redistricting system to encourage 
 
 125. See, e.g., Nature Staff, Special: Data Sharing, 461 NATURE 145 (2009); COMMISSION ON 
BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES AND EDUCATION, SHARING RESEARCH DATA (Stephen 
E. Fienberg, Margaret E. Martin & Miron L. Straf eds., 1985). 
 126. See, e.g., Press Release, Pew Research Center for the People & The Press, Most Have 
Heard Little or Nothing About the Redistricting Debate: Lack of Competition in Elections Fails 
to Stir Public (Oct. 27, 2006) (finding that eighty-nine percent of voters had heard little or 
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broad participation it must overcome this information barrier. It must 
be accessible, easy to use, and be accompanied by sufficient training 
materials and evaluation tools to help novices draw legal redistricting 
plans. It may be that these tools will be insufficient for the masses to 
draw redistricting plans, but even the participation by a few people 
may illuminate different approaches to drawing districts within in a 
state. 
Social networking has blossomed over the past decade, and we 
suspect that this technology can be applied readily to redistricting. 
Map drawers can work collaboratively to improve redistricting plans 
that make sense for their communities. For example, a rural resident 
might start drawing their redistricting plan by importing an urban 
district that the NAACP believes is in compliance with the Voting 
Rights Act. Redistricting authorities and other map-drawers among 
the public may benefit from public commentary on various proposed 
redistricting plans in order to better understand what may or may not 
work in a given community. 
CONCLUSION 
Computers have decreased the costs of redistricting, but they are a 
means and not an end to themselves. By virtue of their ability to 
quickly sort through large amounts of data, computers permit the 
exploration of a greater number of alternative configurations of 
districts within the short period of time between the census and the 
next election. Despite this technical innovation, however, the 
motivations of professional political actors who currently control the 
process in most states remain the same and have at best only 
marginally been more easily realized by the advent of computerized 
redistricting. 
The common goal of those who advocate for automated methods 
or use of indicia as to constrain the motivations of professionals have 
monopolized their power by keeping the process opaque. We are 
skeptical that technical and philosophical practicalities limit the 
application of these methods. We believe, however, that these 
methods can be harnessed to produce a more modest and achievable 
outcome. Computers can transform redistricting by encouraging the 
 
nothing about redistricting, and forty-seven percent of voters did not who was in charge of the 
process). 
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production of a broad variety of legal redistricting plans, and by 
encouraging a robust public discussion over the inherent tradeoffs 
these plans embody. 
The primary effect of these efforts is probably not going to be 
immediate or ignite aggressive reform of the redistricting process. 
Rather, the existence of publicly-drawn plans empowers citizens to 
participate in a process that is generally closed, provides a measuring 
stick against which an official plan may be compared, and establishes 
the existence of a “market” for plans that support political fairness 
and community representational goals. Redistricting outputs may 
change where a redistricting authority is responsive to citizen 
submitted maps or, where partisan gridlock necessitates court 
involvement. Judges may look more favorably on plans drawn by 
citizens than those drawn by redistricting authorities or politicians. 
Reform may follow if a plan adopted by a redistricting authority is 
not as strong as that demanded by the public, which now has both 
knowledge of and a vested interest in the redistricting process. 
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APPENDIX: PROOF OF BIAS IN THE CDR METHOD 
A simple example suffices to prove the basic “computationally-
intensive” method used by Cirincione, Darling, and O’Rourke (CDR) 
for drawing contiguous districts does not produce a representative 
sample of the population of districting plans. Consider a simple 
“state” which is composed of six identically sized and populated block 
groups on a 2x3 grid. Each block group is contiguous with its 
horizontal and vertical neighbors.127 We divide the state into two 
districts, each containing exactly three blocks and we fully enumerate 
the possible districting plans and calculate the probability the CDR 
algorithm will find each solution. The algorithm is biased if all 
solutions do not have the same probability of discovery. 
In this hypothetical state, there are three possible districting plans 
(assuming that the numbering of districts is unimportant, but this 










The contiguous district generation algorithm used by CDR is very 
simple, and thus amenable to formal analysis. As they describe it: 
The first algorithm, the contiguity algorithm, begins by randomly 
selecting a block group to serve as the “base” of the first district. It 
then constructs a “perimeter list” containing the unassigned block 
groups contiguous to the base block group. The program then 
randomly selects a block group from the perimeter list to add to 
 
 127. By constructing the geography with “holes” so that no population units meet at a single 
point, we avoid the issue of whether to treat such units as contiguous. This simplification is 
taken only to clarify the exposition. In fact, decisions about how to measure contiguity (and 
other criteria) are completely independent from the sampling behavior of the algorithm. Our 
example only requires that contiguous relationships not be impossible, a priori. 
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the emerging district and adjusts the perimeter lists. The process 
continues until the population of the emerging district achieves the 
desired population level . . . . The next district begins with the 
random selection of a census block group from among those that 
touch one of the complete districts. [And the process continues 
until a legal plan is generated, or until no more legal districts can 
be created, in which case the process is restarted.]128 
In a true random sample of contiguous districting plans, the 
probability of the method generating each plan would be one-third. 
What is the probability of generating each districting plan using 
CDR’s algorithm? Using the computationally intensive “sampling” 
method, the probability is lower for {1,2,3} than for the other two 
plans.129 The tree below shows all of the possible sequences of choices 
starting from the base block groups 1,2,3 (the paths from the bases 
4,5,6 are symmetric): 
 
 
 128. Cirincione et al., supra note 6, at 196. 
 129. At first glance, one might think this bias is intended to select “compact” districts. In 
fact, this method, as developed by Cirincione et al., is supposed, to select from the universe of 
contiguous plans. They use a different algorithm to select compact plans. 
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Figure 2 
Event-trees showing the generation of the district plans in Figure 2. Each sub-
tree is equally likely (P=1/6), and the probability of following any branch at each 
node is equal to 1/(number of branches). Starred nodes indicate illegal plans, which 
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The total probability of generating plan {1,2,3} during a single run 
of CDR’s algorithm is the probability of the sum of the probabilities 
of the paths  
{{1,2,3}, {3,2,1}, {2,1,3}, {2,3,1}}, 
multiplied by two (for symmetry with starting points (4,5,6)). This 
equals  
(1/36+1/36+1/54+1/54)*2=5/27. 
 The probability of generating plan {1,4,5} (which is the same as the 
probability of {1,2,4} by symmetry) is the sum of the probabilities of 




(The probability of having to start over is 8/27, but this does not affect 
the asymmetry of accepting each plan in later rounds.) Thus, the basic 
algorithm used by CDR is statistically biased, in small samples. 
CDR offers no evidence at all that their method is asymptotically 
unbiased. And note that unlike sampling techniques based on 
statistical theory, the heuristic techniques used by CDR and others 
carry with them no guarantees of unbiasedness or any other 
asymptotic properties. 
